The most indebted countries are among the worst performers in terms of human development indicators.2 Starting from this stylized fact, the donor community (multilateral agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and bilateral donors) seems to agree on two basic principles. First some debt relief/aid is necessary to reduce the human development divide between North and South.3 Second, since aid is fungible, and recipient country governments are sovereign, nothing ensures that the resources generated by an aid program will be devoted to effective poverty reduction policies. If this is the case, a tension might arise between the need to impose conditions limiting the risk of external assistance being mishandled and the efficiency costs that conditionality may create in the recipient economy. In fact, as long as the donors cannot perfectly observe (and monitor) all actions undertaken by recipient country governments, the conditionality they can impose is necessarily incomplete and thus potentially distortionary. Furthermore, in such a situation, a high level of conditionality may absorb an excessive amount of resources, “crowding-out” other investments necessary for the success of the reform program. This paper provides a simple one donor one recipient framework to study these problems.
In our model, the donor’s only concern is the effective implementation of social programs,4while the recipient government obtains utility both from the realization of such programs and from other nonsocially-oriented expenses.5 In such situation, the donor uses the leverage associated with aid (or debt relief) to impose, through conditionality, its own preferences on how resources should be allocated.6
In such a framework, we prove three results that shed some light on the important policy issue of how to optimally design conditionality when the objectives of the donor and those of the recipient are not perfectly aligned. First, conditionality entails distortions and is responsible for an inefficient allocation of resources. Second, aid policies should be tailored according to the recipient government’s preferences in terms of social spending—its social commitment—and the optimal amount of conditionality varies (generally in a nonmonotonic way) with the latter. Finally, if the characteristics of the recipient government are not observable or, alternatively, if the aid contract cannot depend upon the type of government, conditionality can be used to screen countries (governments). Then, excessive and/or insufficient levels of conditionality, relative to the case where the recipient’s type is observable, may arise as equilibrium outcomes. This may also lead to forms of aid rationing.
The intuition for such results is as follows: In our framework, only some of the policy measures that contribute to the success of a social program are verifiable, and thus can be subject to conditionality. Under such circumstances, if the donor forces the recipient government to allocate substantial resources to certain verifiable components of the program, such as investments in infrastructure, the latter will underinvest in other less verifiable components, such as administrative and managerial outlays, costly supportive policies, or other implementation expenses. Furthermore, as the reaction of the recipient government to the imposition of conditionality depends upon its social commitment, the donor needs to design conditionality according to the recipient’s type. From this, it follows that when conditionality is used as a screening device, the donor may have (and generally has to) impose levels of conditionality that would be suboptimal if the recipient’s type were observable.
The idea that properly designed conditionality may enhance the effectiveness of “socially friendly” aid programs is gaining increasing support. For instance, whereas in the past NGOs often voiced a strong disagreement with the very principle of conditionality in structural adjustment programs, they now recognize that some form of conditionality is needed for the debt relief project to be conducive to poverty reduction. According to CISDE-Caritas International (1999): “Because not all governments can be counted on to use resources freed through debt relief to invest in the poor and marginalized sectors of society, there is a case for making a strong link between investment in human development and debt cancellation.” Oxfam International also points out possible incentive compatibility problems in the debt relief and poverty reduction strategy, and stresses that the “the focus should be on the development of incentives for converting debt relief into poverty reduction investments.”7 In contrast, a large literature emphasizes the limits and the potential costs of conditionally,8 and nowadays there is substantial evidence that “conditional” aid alone cannot buy a successful social program. Burnside and Dollar (2000) show, indeed, that only in the presence of sound policies aid does foster growth. Instead, in countries with a poor policy environment, large amounts of aid can not only be ineffective but also, by allowing governments to delay reforms, may even be detrimental to growth (World Bank, 1998).
The theoretical literature on the effectiveness of aid in the presence of strategic interaction between donors and recipient governments is limited.9 Notable exceptions are Svensson (2000a) and (2000b), Azam and Laffont (2001), and Federico (2001). The first paper by Svensson develops a game theoretic rent-seeking model to assess the effect of aid windfalls on the provision of public goods when social groups compete over common-pool resources. Closely related to our paper is Svensson (2000b) which studies the strategic interaction between a donor and two recipients in a model in which the donor cares uniquely about the welfare of the poor while the recipients also pursue other goals. Since, as in our model, the effectiveness of poverty alleviation programs depends on a nonverifiable implementation effort on the recipient’s part, the first-best aid contract is unenforceable. While our setup shares some of the key features of Svensson (2000b), the focus of our analysis is different. In fact, while our interest is in designing an ex ante full commitment optimal aid contract which depends on the characteristics of recipient governments, in Svensson recipients are ex ante identical and the main problem the donor faces is one of commitment. There, it is the very anticipation that aid flows will (ex post) be disbursed according to the need of the poor that negatively affects the recipient government’s incentives to carry out effective social programs. Along similar lines, Federico (2001) studies the optimal level of conditionality in a model in which donor’s commitment is limited. The focus on ex ante full-commitment contracts links our paper to Azam and Laffont (2001). They also study the characteristics of incentive-compatible aid contracts when the preference of the donor and those of the recipient are not aligned. The main difference between our model and theirs is that we do not assume complete contracts (perfect monitoring) and thus we allow conditionality to be distortionary. This has important implications on the way in which conditionality should be used as a screening device. Marchesi and Thomas (1999) also explore the idea of screening by (costly) conditionality in the context of IMF programs aimed at maximizing the expected repayment of the debt. In this paper, we borrow that idea and apply it to the case where the principal’s objective is the maximization of the social impact of aid rather than the repayment of the debt.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the basic model and discusses the optimal level of conditionality that an altruistic donor would impose in exchange for an aid program when it can observe the recipient’s type (its level of social commitment). Section III deals with the case in which the donor cannot observe the recipient’s type and explains why conditionality can be excessive (or insufficient) when it is used as a screening device. Section IV concludes.
II. The Model
In our model, the international community is represented by a single donor who is willing to grant an aid/debt relief program that provides fresh resources that a developing country government (the recipient, from now on) might devote to poverty reduction programs. Formally, we denote by G the recipient tax revenue (net of the debt service), and by A, the amount of aid/debt relief, which we assume to be fixed.10
The recipient (denoted by subscript R) devotes its budgetary resources to developmental and nondevelopmental consumption. In particular, we assume that it maximizes the following CES objective function
where s denotes the consumption of a social good (for instance, social programs such as poverty alleviation, primary education, access to safe water, etc.); m denotes nondevelopmental consumption (military expenses, for instance); α ∈ (0, 1) defines the recipient’s “social preferences;”11 and ρ belongs to the interval (0, 1). We further assume that the social good is produced out of two inputs (k, e) one of which is observable and verifiable by the donor (k), and the other is not (e). We can think of the first as capital (e.g., material needed to build a school or a hospital) and of the second as nonmonitorable effort (administrative and managerial outlays, or other costly supportive policies needed for a school or a hospital to work). Alternatively, we could have assumed that some of the activities needed for the success of a poverty reduction program were inherently multitasking, so that the donor could only exercise control over a part of the recipient’s budget. What is indeed critical for our analysis is that both the monitorable and nonmonitorable input are essential for the production of the social good or, less loosely, that the technology for the production of the social good is convex.
Then, for the sake of simplicity, and without great loss of generality, we assume that the social good is produced according to the following technology s = ke, which is symmetric in the two inputs. We further assume that the recipient government has no access to the international capital market,12 and thus that it has to run a balanced budget, both in the case in which aid/debt relief is granted and in the case in which it is not, that is,
As we already mentioned, in our set-up the donor is fully altruistic, and only cares about the success of social programs. If this is the case its objective function may be written as
with f’(.) > 0. In Section III, we briefly consider the case of aid programs that are costly for the donor country.
A. No Conditionality Benchmark
In what follows, we first characterize the effect of aid in the absence of any form of conditionality. Then, we briefly discuss the characteristics of the aid contract in the case in which all components of the social programs are observable and contractible upon, to then analyze the more interesting (and realistic case) in which the donor is unable to contract upon some of the actions of the recipient. Finally, we discuss situations in which the donor cannot either observe the recipient’s social commitment or write aid contracts that are contingent on α.
As a useful benchmark, we first consider the case in which the donor imposes no restrictions on the recipient’s budget allocation. In the absence of conditionality, the government will allocate resources to maximize its objective function (1) subject to the budget constraint (2). After substituting (2) into (1), the problem of the recipient can be written as
Since the technology for the production of the social good is convex and symmetric in the two inputs, in equilibrium, the recipient government allocates an equal amount of resources to the capital and the managerial component of social expenditure. The solution of problem (4) is thus given by k* = e* = x*; where x* belongs to the interval
If δ = 0, the solution of problem (14) gives the values kNA and eNA that the recipient country government would choose in absence of aid, the superscript NA standing for no aid. This also identifies the recipient’s reservation utility that can be written as
When, instead, δ =1, the solution of problem (4) yields the budget allocation chosen by the recipient when aid is granted but no conditionality is imposed, which we denote kNC and eNC, the superscript NC standing for no conditionality.
Finally, as long as under unconditional aid the social good is produced in positive amounts, its production level increases monotonically with the amount of aid granted by the donor (as well as with the level of social commitment of the recipient). Aid is thus likely to increase the amount of resources that the recipient is willing to devote to social spending. However, for any α < 1, the objectives of the recipient and those of the donor are not perfectly aligned and the latter should be able to obtain a larger production of the social good by imposing conditionality when granting aid. This brings us to the next section.
B. Optimal Conditionality When “Types” are Observable
Should the donor have full control over all the components of social spending in the recipient country or, alternatively, should it be able to contract on both capital and managerial expenditures, then the first best would be implementable. The optimal contract would be one that maximizes the donor’s utility (3) subject to the individual rationality (IR) constraint of the recipient, defined below. In other words, the equilibrium level of k and e would yield the highest level of production of the social good for which the recipient is at least as well off as in absence of aid.
In what follows, we consider the more reasonable and interesting case in which the donor can only observe, and make aid conditional upon the capital component of social programs, k, and thus the recipient is free to choose any nonnegative amount for the other component, e. This captures the idea that the relation between the donor community and a recipient government is a complex one in which both actors act strategically. Recipients react to conditionality by reallocating the budget expenditure in order to maximize their objective function. This in turn implies that the donor will have to take into account the response of the recipient when setting conditionality on k. Formally, for any fixed level of k > kNC imposed by the donor, the recipient will maximize (4) with respect to e. The first order necessary and sufficient condition for a maximum can be written as
from which it follows that the optimal unobserved component of social spending, ê (k), is given by
We can now write the problem of the donor as
where the last expression is the IR constraint of the recipient. We denote by kIR the value of k for which the IR is exactlv binding, that is.
To characterize the solution of problem (8), we first prove the following proposition that sheds some light on the costs and the advantages associated with the imposition of conditionality in aid programs:
(i) Any binding level of conditionality (k > kNC) induces a distortion in the production of the social good (ê(k)< k). However, (ii) by imposing conditionality, the donor can always improve on the production of the social good
See Appendix I.
The previous proposition shows that even if some components of the budget cannot be contracted upon, the donor can strictly improve the effectiveness of aid by imposing conditionality on the contractible component of social spending. However, since for any k > kNC, ê(k) < k, the recipient reacts to conditionality on the monitorable input by reducing expenditures (with respect to the efficient level) on the other input. This is clearly inefficient, as both the donor and the recipient would be better off if it were possible to reallocate some of the resources from the capital to the managerial component of social spending. The fact that this is not possible is one main feature of our model, and depends upon the characterization of the donor/recipient interaction as a noncooperative game. In such a game, the recipient exploits the donor’s inability to observe some of the inputs necessary for the production of the social good to reallocate resources according to its own preferences. In our setup, the donor (acting as a Stackelberg leader) anticipates the reaction of the recipient when choosing the “right” amount of conditionality to attach to an aid program. Notwithstanding the fact that in our model conditionality is costly, the second part of Proposition 1 provides a strong justification for the use of conditionality in poverty reduction program financed by the donor community. In fact, for any level of social commitment of the recipient, we prove the existence of a level of conditionality, that is acceptable for the recipient (i.e., compatible with its IR constraint) and, at the same time, that it increases the level of production of the social good.
With this in mind, we are now able to characterize the optimal amount of conditionality that the donor would impose upon a recipient government of type a in order to maximize the production of the social good. Formally, the optimal amount of conditionality kC(α) is given by
(i) kIRis strictly increasing in,
See Appendix I.
According to Lemma 1, on the one hand, more socially committed governments are willing to accept higher levels of conditionality: kIR is increasing in α. On the other hand, because of the convexity in the production of the social good, the donor will want to abstain from imposing excessive conditionality on governments that would, by themselves, choose a high level of social spending. This in turns implies that
If the amount of aid granted by the donor is not too large relative to the country’s own resources
See Appendix I.
The intuition for this proposition is the following: When the amount of aid is not large (with respect to the recipient’s own resources), it is likely to be the case that for socially uncommitted government, the IR constraint is binding at the “optimum” level of conditionality
III. Conditionality Whenα Is Not Observable
The analysis in the previous section showed that the optimal level of conditionality on social spending depends upon the characteristics of the recipient government. Furthermore, when conditionality can be imposed only on some components of the budget, the relationship between the social commitment of the recipient government, α, and the optimal level of “conditional” social spending is not necessarily monotonic (Proposition 2). In this section, we explore the implications of those results when the “type” of the recipient government is not observable or when the aid contract cannot depend upon the type of the government.
The situation we have in mind is one where, because of political changes or regime switches (like the end of a war), the recipient government’s track record is either not available or cannot be used to infer its preferences with regard to social expenditure. In that context, we show that the donor’s inability to impose type-specific conditionality leads to inefficiencies and, under certain conditions, to a form of aid rationing. Alternatively, we can assume that for political constraints (related to certain horizontal equity considerations), the donor community cannot grant aid to a country A and deny it to a country B, if both countries are willing to agree on the same level of conditionality. This can very well be the case for multilateral organizations that are committed (often by statute) to the uniformity of treatment of their members.
The donor’s inability to impose type-dependent conditionality entails, as expected, an inefficiency that reduces the utility that it can derive from aid relative to the case in which a is contractible upon. In what follows, we focus on two particular aspect of that problem: first, we discuss situations in which excessive or insufficient conditionality arise as equilibrium outcomes; second we investigate the possibility that informational asymmetries between donors and recipients lead to a particularly bad outcome in which debt relief is denied to countries that would obtain it if they were able to credibly signal their type to the donor.
A. Conditionality as a Screening Device
Assume that the donor is willing to grant aid only to governments that have a sufficient social commitment. More precisely, assume that there is an
In a context where α is not observable, conditionality can be used to screen out recipients with a low degree of social commitment. Indeed, as the individual rationality constraint of the recipient is increasing in α, a sufficiently high level of k will have the effect of screening out government with a weak social commitment. However, such screening comes to a cost, namely excessive or insufficient conditionality. We can distinguish two cases.
In the first case, see Figure 1(i), the cut-off government below which no aid would be granted lies in a region where the IR constraint is not binding15
Figure 1Screening by Conditionality
In the second case, see Figure l (ii), the cut-off government below which no relief would be granted lies in a region where the IR constraint is binding
The use of conditionality as screening device may entail distortions as too little or too much conditionality may be imposed on recipient countries.
This in turn may lead to forms of aid rationing. Indeed, it is possible that countries worth being granted aid when a is contractible upon (meaning with conditionality based upon their true type) are not worth being granted aid if conditionality cannot be tailored to their type. This case is examined next.
B. Aid Rationing
The discussion in the previous section highlights a simple problem: the donor may have to impose an excessive amount of conditionality in order to screen out socially unfriendly governments (see Figure 1). This directly translates in a loss of donor’s utility relative to the case where the type of the government is observable.
Assume now that donors are willing to grant aid only under the expectation that the resulting production of the social good would be above a certain threshold C. This assumption is consistent with the idea that voters in donor countries would consider unsuccessful any aid policy that did not achieve some minimum objective in terms of social good production, irrespectively of the initial conditions in the recipient country.
If the recipient’s type is observable this maps directly into a donor’s policy granting relief only to some government types, namely the more socially committed ones.16 Let now
We now show that, in presence of asymmetric information, the use of conditionality as a screening device not only yields excessive (or insufficient) conditionality, but it can also lead to aid rationing. With rationing here we define a situation in which governments that would receive aid/debt relief if they could credibly signal their type to the donor are denied it because of asymmetric information problems. Formally, we can state the following result:
If α is not observable, there will be aid rationing if and only if
See Appendix I.
The intuition for this result is the following: If the donor screens out socially uncommitted recipients, imposing a level of conditionality that corresponds to the optimal level for recipient
then all governments with
so that there is a total “market failure” and no country receives aid.
Finally, it is worth noting that donor’s ability to use conditionality as a screening device depends crucially on the form of their utility function. The results in this section rely on the implicit assumption that donors rank recipient governments by their type. That assumption is consistent with a situation where the utility donors obtain from aid is increasing in a. However, that is not necessarily the case when the donor’s utility function is not linear in the production of the social good. In that case, although the absolute increase in the production of the social good associated with aid is always increasing in the recipient’s type, donors may want to focus instead on its relative increase. In other words, donors may want to concentrate on recipient’s for which aid “makes a difference;” that is governments that in the absence of aid would allocate very few resources to social spending.
In that context, it can be shown that if the donor’s marginal utility decreases “fast enough” with the production of the social good, the “preferred” recipients will not be those with highest degree of social commitment. Under those circumstances, the effectiveness of conditionality as a screening device is further diminished. Indeed, since the sorting of recipients relies entirely on the IR constraint, one cannot exclude high-type governments without also denying aid to recipients with lower propensities to social spending.
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
It is well known that not all aid recipient governments have used, nor can they be counted upon to use, developmental assistance to effectively improve the standards of living of the poorest sectors of their societies. This has led many in the donor community to argue in favor of establishing a direct link between new aid programs (such as debt cancellation) and investment in social programs.17 In this paper, we have provided a formal analysis of some of the pros and cons of such conditionality.
We have showed that when the social preferences of donor and recipient countries differ, donors may use the leverage associated with aid programs (or debt relief) to influence, through conditionality, the policies of the recipients. However, to the extent that aid is fungible and not all the relevant actions of the recipient government can be observed and contracted upon, conditionality needs to balance the benefits of imposing a certain level of social spending, with the costs arising from a distorted allocation of resources. In addition, consistent with the recent empirical literature, we showed that the effectiveness of conditionality is largely dependent on the recipient’s commitment to the social program, so that conditionality should be designed according to the social preferences of the latter. Finally, in the more realistic context where donors cannot observe recipient’s preferences or cannot policy-discriminate across recipients, the paper shows that conditionality may be effective in selecting the governments with the strongest social commitment. However, such use of conditionality as screening device entails costs associated with the imposition of suboptimal levels of conditionality on recipient countries. This may lead to forms of aid rationing if governments who would be granted aid if they could credibly signal their social commitment were instead denied aid because of the donor’s inability to discriminate between them and less socially committed ones.
From a policy standpoint, by stressing the limits of conditionality, our model suggests that recipient governments need to play a crucial and active role for the successful implementation of a poverty reduction program. In that sense, our results provide some analytical support to the argument that aid (or debt relief) can only be successful in reducing poverty when there is “program ownership” on the part of the recipient country.18
Furthermore, our analysis of the asymmetric information case has some implications for the issue of cross-country aid distribution when political and informational constraints prevent donors from tailoring their policy to the structural characteristics of recipient countries. In that context, our model suggests that conditionality can act as an effective, although costly, screening device if donors want to select the most socially committed recipients. However, it also points out that such strategy is not effective if the targets of aid/debt-relief programs are countries with governments of an “intermediate” type, where foreign intervention may make “more of a difference.”
From a methodological standpoint, we model the incompleteness of aid contracts by assuming that only a subset of the recipient’s actions is observable and monitorable by donors. This allows us to analyze a situation where aid is disbursed before the production and the consumption of the social good occur. An alternative approach is to assume, as in standard contract problems, that the donor is able to observe the production of the social good, but only with an error.19 Then, the donor can impose ex post conditionality by linking debt relief to the observed amount of the social good. Note that, in that context, if recipients are risk neutral, the optimal solution involves making the recipients the residual claimants. However, if recipients are risk\averse, the optimal solution involves some risk sharing and hence distortions. We chose our ex ante approach because it provided a simple way of representing limits in the scope of conditionality and the associated distortions in terms of mix of reforms often debated in the related policy literature. In addition, the ex ante approach has the attractive feature of being consistent with the notion that ex post punishments of “bad” recipient governments can be severely limited by Samaritan-dilemma considerations (see Federico, 2001).
Finally, it is worth noting that although this paper discusses some of the problems associated with conditionality, it falls far short from addressing them all. In particular, our framework cannot deal effectively with issues related to the debate on the streamlining of conditionality. In our model, for the given information structure, conditionality is always optimal in equilibrium. It follows that there is no room for the notion of “excessive” conditionality defined as a level of conditionality that, if reduced, would increase the production of the social good.
A. Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Since for any k > kNC conditionality is binding,
Suppose ê(k) >kNC. Since U’(k, 0) >0, and U(.) is concave in e, a necessary condition for ê(k) >k is that
However, because of the symmetry of the production function, at ê(k) = k > kNC, (13) can be written as
which contradicts (12).
(ii) Now, totally differentiating (6), we obtain
In addition, as ê (kNC)=kNC, from (14) it follows that
Hence, a necessary condition for the donor’s first order conditions to be verified is that
B. Proof of Lemma 1
(i) By totally differentiating the IR constraint, we have
so that the two terms into brackets in the numerator have the same sign. Now, from the first order conditions of the recipient we can write
Since kNA<kIR, this in turns means that
this jointly with the IR constraint implies kIRê (k1R)>kNAeNA, which means that the numerator of (15) is negative, (a) and (b) in turn imply that
(ii) The problem of the donor is that of
and the first order conditions are given by:
Since neither k = 0, nor k = G can be a solution of the problem (in both cases s = 0) and
since the maximand is continuous in k, an interior solution
Finally, for (16) to be verified it is necessary that
have discordant signs, and this is the case only if
When α→1, the preference of the donor and those of the recipient converge and the optimal (nonbinding level) of conditionality is
C. Proof of Proposition 2
D. Proof of Proposition 3
For α >αcof, by definition, we have
This means that at least the marginal government is rationed out under asymmetric information.
In addition, as
so that no recipient that would have been granted relief under α observable is denied it.
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