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Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome'

Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome' »

Source: Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome'

Volume/Issue: 1999/100

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 1999

ISBN: 9781451852387

Keywords: Banking Crises, Capital Account Liberalization, Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard, international capital, deposit rates, international capital markets

The removal of government guarantees in borrowing countries does not eliminate the moral hazard problem posed by the existence of deposit guarantees in lender countries. The paper shows that, after restrictions on...

The International Lender of Last Resort

The International Lender of Last Resort »

Source: The International Lender of Last Resort : How Large is Large Enought?

Volume/Issue: 2001/76

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Olivier Jeanne

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 May 2001

ISBN: 9781451849875

Keywords: bank runs, multiple equilibria, credit crunch, exchange rate regime, deposit insurance, Asian crisis, exchange rate, banking, foreign exchange, banking sector

This paper considers how an international lender of last resort (LOLR) can prevent self-fulfilling banking and currency crises in emerging economies. We compare two different arrangements: one in which the internat...

Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome'

Global Moral Hazard, Capital Account Liberalization and the 'Overlending Syndrome' »

Volume/Issue: 1999/100

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 1999

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451852387.001

ISBN: 9781451852387

Keywords: Banking Crises, Capital Account Liberalization, Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard, international capital, deposit rates, international capital markets

The removal of government guarantees in borrowing countries does not eliminate the moral hazard problem posed by the existence of deposit guarantees in lender countries. The paper shows that, after restrictions on...

The International Lender of Last Resort
			: How Large is Large Enought?

The International Lender of Last Resort : How Large is Large Enought? »

Volume/Issue: 2001/76

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Olivier Jeanne

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 May 2001

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451849875.001

ISBN: 9781451849875

Keywords: bank runs, multiple equilibria, credit crunch, exchange rate regime, deposit insurance, Asian crisis, exchange rate, banking, foreign exchange, banking sector

This paper considers how an international lender of last resort (LOLR) can prevent self-fulfilling banking and currency crises in emerging economies. We compare two different arrangements: one in which the internat...