Browse

You are looking at 1 - 4 of 4 items :

  • Keywords: Poverty x
Clear All
Budget Support Versus Project Aid

Budget Support Versus Project Aid »

Source: Budget Support Versus Project Aid

Volume/Issue: 2003/88

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Tito Cordella , and Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2003

ISBN: 9781451851182

Keywords: aid policy, asymmetric information, empirical growth models, budget support, budget surplus, capital expenditures, budget constraint, capital expenditure, Asymmetric and Private Information, Welfare and Poverty: General

Should donors who are interested in the effectiveness of developmental programs rely on conditional budget support or on project aid? To answer this question, we present a model in which only a subset of the develo...

Budget Support Versus Project Aid

Budget Support Versus Project Aid »

Volume/Issue: 2003/88

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Tito Cordella , and Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2003

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451851182.001

ISBN: 9781451851182

Keywords: aid policy, asymmetric information, empirical growth models, budget support, budget surplus, capital expenditures, budget constraint, capital expenditure, Asymmetric and Private Information, Welfare and Poverty: General

Should donors who are interested in the effectiveness of developmental programs rely on conditional budget support or on project aid? To answer this question, we present a model in which only a subset of the develo...

Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs

Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs »

Volume/Issue: 2002/115

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Giovanni Dell'Ariccia , and Tito Cordella

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2002

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451853872.001

ISBN: 9781451853872

Keywords: Asymmetric Information, social spending, poverty alleviation, Information And Uncertainty, Welfare And Poverty,

When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor al...

Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs

Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs »

Source: Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs

Volume/Issue: 2002/115

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Giovanni Dell'Ariccia , and Tito Cordella

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 July 2002

ISBN: 9781451853872

Keywords: Asymmetric Information, social spending, poverty alleviation, Information And Uncertainty, Welfare And Poverty,

When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor al...